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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts of the Respondent is replete with 
inaccuracies and mischaracterizations as to the facts in the 
record. The City implies, for example, that the original 
building permit for the property of Plaintiffs was for a home 
only when, at all times, the plan was for a home and dental 
office. (Tr. 13-14.) The City further implies that the City 
Engineer, Mr. Huefner, was not authorized to tell the Plaintiffs 
what the setback requirements from Cedar Hills Drive were or to 
verify the setback, when the testimony of Mr. Huefner was to the 
contrary. (Tr. 316.) The City further suggests that Plaintiffs 
constructed the new improvements to their home, including the 
garage and patient parking lot, without building permits when the 
City knows that such building permits, in accordance with the 
Federal Court Settlement Agreement, were not necessary. 
These, and similar misstatements are important, as 
background information, but certainly not dispositive. However, 
the City makes one statement of fact which is not only false but 
extremely crucial to a proper understanding of the case at hand. 
On page five (5) of its Brief, the City states in 
subparagraph (m) that as a part of the application process for 
the construction of the fence, Plaintiffs presented to the City a 
map representing their property lines as well as their knowledge 
of the eighty foot (80•) Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way. The 
Respondent then states in subparagraph (n) that "in reliance on 
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Plaintiffs1 map, City Engineer Sonntag prepared a drawing 
(Exhibit 18) and placed stakes along the west edge of the right-
of-way to assist the City Council in getting a rough idea of 
Plaintiffs1 proposed fence project." 
The statements made in subparagraphs (m) and (n) above are 
simply not true. The record supports only one scenario: 
1. On October 12, 1983, the City Council specifically 
directed the City Engineer to go to the Plaintiff's property and 
stake the right-of-way lines so that the City Council could 
understand the proximity of the proposed fence to the right-of-
way and to Plaintiff's home and property. (Tr. 117.) 
2. In accordance with those instructions, the City Engineer 
visited the property of the Plaintiffs on October 13, 1983 and 
located the right-of-way line. He then calculated the distance 
between the right-of-way line and Plaintiff's home to be thirty-
one feet (31f). There is no question that at the time of these 
measurements no map, drawing, sketch or illustration of 
Plaintiff's property had been prepared by anyone. (Tr. 117-18.) 
3. Only after the City Engineer had given the information 
as to the distance between the right-of-way line and the home, 
did Plaintiffs prepare a rough sketch. (Tr. 119) 
4. On the Monday following October 13, 1983, the City 
Engineer again went to the property of the Plaintiffs. He 
located the right-of-way line of Cedar Hills Drive and staked the 
same so that the distance could be viewed by the City Council. 
After the staking was done, and after it was viewed by the entire 
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City Council, the City Engineer prepared a map showing the 
distance between the right-of-way line and Plaintiff's home to be 
thirty-one feet (31'). (Tr. 123; Exh. 18) 
Any attempt on the part of the City to somehow claim that 
it, or its City Engineer, relied upon any information given by 
the Plaintiffs as to the location of Cedar Hills Drive is totally 
without support in the record. If this were this the case, the 
distance between Plaintiff's home and the right-of-way line would 
have been thirty-five feet (35'), for such was the distance which 
Plaintiffs believed existed between their home and the right-of-
way line, not the thirty-one feet (311) calculated by the City 
Engineer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE CLEARLY PROVEN 
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL. 
The Respondent implies that the elements of estoppel to be 
applied in this case are different than as set out by this Court 
in the case of Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). However, the elements of 
estoppel are simple to understand, easy to apply and have not 
changed since recitation of the same by this Court in Celebrity 
Club. Indeed, this Court reaffirmed and restated the elements of 
a proper estoppel case in Williams v. Public Service Com'n of 
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Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988)- In that decision this Court, in 
the process of reaffirming Celebrity Club stated: 
In so holding [in Celebrity Club] , we set forth three 
elements of equitable estoppel: 
(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) Injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such admissions, statement, or act. Id.at 53. 
The above is a clear, concise and simple statement of the 
elements of estoppel. What should be equally as clear is that 
Plaintiffs have proven each of these elements. The following 
analysis illustrates this fact: 
ELEMENT NO. 1 
An admission, statement, or 
act inconsistent with 
the claim afterwards asserted. 
EVIDENCE 
The City, on three separate 
occasions, stated to 
Plaintiffs that the 
right-of-way line of 
Cedar Hills Drive was more 
than thirty-feet (30f) from 
their home. The first 
statement occurred when 
Plaintiff's home was built. 
The second statement occurred 
when the City Engineer 
measured Plaintiff's property 
on October 13, 1983. The 
third statement occurred when 
the City Engineer placed 
stakes on the property of 
Plaintiffs and gave Plaintiffs 
a map showing the distance 
to be thirty-one feet (31'). 
ELEMENT NO, 2 EVIDENCE 
Action by the other party 
on the faith of such admission, 
statement or act. 
Plaintiffs specifically 
relied on the acts of the 
City by constructing 
improvements on the property 
in the form of their home 
and, in particular, the 
driveway to the new garage 
facility. 
ELEMENT NO. 3 
Injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the 
first party to contradict 
or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act. 
EVIDENCE 
While the injury to the 
Plaintiff is more fully 
discussed hereafter, the 
injury is self-evident. 
Plaintiffs expended 
substantial sums of money to 
construct their home and to 
construct a driveway in 
specific reliance upon the 
repeated representations of 
the City. 
As is shown above, each of the elements of estoppel is met 
by the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs. This Court should 
not be misled to believe that any of the evidence cited above is 
disputed. Each of the facts which have been stated are, at the 
present time, unquestioned by either party. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL AND EGREGIOUS INJURY. 
At the core of the Brief of the Respondent is the claim 
that Plaintiffs have suffered no real injury as the result of the 
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representations made by the City. However, this argument is 
simply not supported by the facts. 
The facts show that the Plaintiffs, as a consequence of the 
earlier Settlement Agreement with the City, had been granted 
leave to build a large, multiple car garage, which would have 
access directly on to Cedar Hills Drive. However, at the time 
the City specifically identified the location of the right-of-
way in 1983, the Plaintiffs had not commenced the construction of 
the driveways which would be necessary to gain access to these 
garages. The fact, further, is that only after the City 
specifically located the right-of-way line, did Plaintiffs 
commence the construction of these driveways. 
At first blush, one would not think that the mere 
construction of a driveway would constitute a substantial injury 
from which an estoppel could spring. However, the driveways 
constructed by Plaintiffs were neither common nor ordinary, but 
constituted a major construction project. The driveways 
consisted of more than twelve inches (12fl) of concrete reinforced 
with metal bars on approximately twelve inch (12") centers. 
Plaintiffs believed, based upon the specific representations 
of the City, that the right-of-way line was out from the 
foundation of the garages thirty-one feet (311). They built 
these driveways to within one foot (lf) of the right-of-way line. 
This means that more than twenty feet (20•) of the driveways, as 
constructed, are located within the right-of-way of Cedar Hills 
6 
Drive. The approximate width of these driveways is thirty feet 
(301). Therefore, in reliance upon what the City told them, the 
Plaintiffs laid twelve inches (12") of reinforced concrete 
covering an area of approximately twenty feet (20') by thirty 
feet (30*)• (Exh. 28.) 
The injury is made even more substantial by the fact that 
the Trial Court awarded the City damages equal to the alleged 
cost of removing this very same concrete. In other words, the 
Plaintiffs spent substantial time, money and effort to build 
driveways to their garage only to learn that they had been built 
within the right-of-way. Now that the construction is complete 
and paid for, unless the Trial Court is reversed, the Plaintiffs 
will be required to pay the City to remove those driveways. All 
of this because the City, not the Plaintiffs, made a mistake. 
The words "substantial" and "egregious" are not only 
appropriate in the circumstances but are the only words which 
will describe the injury and injustice which have been caused to 
Plaintiffs. All of this could have been avoided if the City had 
simply done its job properly and carefully. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent spent substantial time arguing that estoppel 
against that government is an extraordinary remedy and one which 
is to be imposed only in the most flagrant circumstances. 
Perhaps Plaintiffs would be well advised to agree with that 
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position, for in this case, the most flagrant of circumstances is 
present. Time after time after time, the City assured Plaintiffs 
that they had thirty-one feet (311) between their home and what 
is a major traffic thoroughfare in Price City. They built their 
house accordingly. They constructed other substantial 
improvements to their property accordingly. The Respondent has 
presented to this Court no good reason why estoppel should not be 
imposed other than to say "because we are the Government." 
In this case, the Government has gone too far. A case of 
estoppel was overwhelmingly proven in the Trial Court. The 
decision of the Trial Court is in error and should be overturned. 
DATED This 2_day of May, 1989. 
POOLE & SWlTI 
IE R. SMITi 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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